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Abstract
Purpose of review: This review addresses the question of energy security. With the transition
of energy generation fleet to cleaner, more sustainable electricity production, energy security
is a topic of increasing importance.
Recent findings: Recent events in Texas brought the concept of energy security to the fore. In
this review we examine the makeup of electricity generation and the causes of the February
2021 blackout of Texas. We will investigate the cost/benefit of winterization in Texas and ask
why this was not undertaken subsequent to a similar event in 2011.
Summary: We investigate the case of Texas blackout of February 2021 and estimate the cost
of prevention of this undesirable outcome. We suggest that market mechanisms need to be in
place to incentivize electricity producers to ensure energy security going forward.
Introduction
One of the main outstanding challenges of today’s electricity markets is energy security. To
alleviate emissions and remedy climate change, there is an increasing burden of heating and
transport electrification on the electricity grid, and simultaneously, penetration of volatile
renewable energy sources into the generation mix. It is clear that now, more than ever, electric
grids are exposed to the risk of supply shortage and its highly negative consequences.
In this article, we review the February 2021 events of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT) market and explore remedies through weatherization of generation sources. We will
start by summarizing the basic structure of ERCOT as laid out in [1] and [2]. We will then
present the events of February 2021 and explore the causes. We will provide an analysis of
weatherization of the so called “just in time” generation equipment. We will briefly discuss
possible market structure improvements to incentivize participants for taking such measures
and conclude the article with a summary. (We note that market mechanisms are not the only
way to get obtain a resilient system. Regulations and/or a set of standards/certification process
are also options.)
Market Description for ERCOT
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas was established in 1970. Since 1996, ERCOT has
brokered the wholesale electricity market in Texas. ERCOT is governed by a board of directors
and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) and the Texas
Legislature. ERCOT facilitates a competitive wholesale market in Texas to maintain a reliable
electric power system consisting of generation, transmission and ultimately consumption,
meeting the needs of nearly 28 million Texas homes. The generation mix of ERCOT is
provided in Table [1], which indicates that three quarters of the generation is “just in time,”
supplied by natural gas flowing in pipelines that run across the state from areas like the Permian
Basin in West Texas to major demand centers like Houston and Dallas, or supplied by wind.
GENERATION
TYPE

INSTALLED
CAPACITY

MARKET
CAPACITY?
PERCENTAGE

NATURAL GAS
WIND
COAL

51,667 MW
31,390 MW
13,630 MW

47.45
28.83
12.52

SOLAR
NUCLEAR

6,177 MW
5,153 MW

5.57
4.73

Table 1 ERCOT generation mix
ERCOT manages the power flow across the Texas Interconnection, which is not connected to
either the Eastern or the Western Interconnections in the US. Soon after the February extreme
cold event in Texas, it was suggested (see [3]) that the event may cause Texas to join the rest
of the US grid – something Texans have been reluctant to do for the past many decades.
Extreme Cold Event of Feb 2021
In advance of each season – fall, winter, spring and summer – ERCOT develops a Seasonal
Assessment of Resource Adequacy known as SARA reports. The report focuses on the
availability of sufficient operating reserves that would be able to avoid emergency actions such
as implementing voluntary load reduction resources. For the 2021 Winter season, the SARA
report predicted that the “Forecasted Season Peak Load” scenario expected about 74,000 MW
of net resource capacity would be available to meet a winter peak of 57,699 MW (see [4]).
Nevertheless, on February 8th the weather models began to show worrisome weather for their
service regions, though there was uncertainty of timing and severity of the extreme cold
weather fronts. On February 10th, “the total amount of offline power plant capacity increased
from 14,400 MW to 25,850 MW, or about 12% to 21% of the total 123,050 MW of installed
nameplate capacity in ERCOT” (see [4]). Similarly, on this day, ERCOT began to see wind
turbine outages as the fog was resulting in ice accumulation on the blades and later on the
gearboxes and nacelles. The generators fueled with natural gas were also facing issues due to
a lack of fuel supplies, which resulted in the generators going offline or derating. We discuss
icing issues and mitigation strategies as well as effects of the cold weather on generation from
natural gas in the next section. The winter storm progressed to a Winter Weather Advisory
(WWA) and subsequently a Winter Storm Watch (WSW) on the 10th and 11th of February.
Throughout the nights of February 13th and 14th, the weather dropped to “extreme low”
temperatures (Dallas for instance reached a low of 3 degrees Fahrenheit), whereupon the state
officially went into a Hard Freeze Warning. ERCOT deployed responsive reserves and issued
an emergency notice. On the night of the 13th generators began to go offline and by noon on
February 14th approximately 8,400 MW of capacity was offline due to existing outages. The
majority of this capacity (7,700 MW) was from coal and natural gas power plants. On the
morning of February 15th, ERCOT declared a Level 3 Energy Emergency Alert that had caused
blackouts. The resource status on the morning of February 16th indicated a shortage of 28,345
MW in capacity. The shortage might have been prevented or at least mitigated to some extent
had measures been taken to protect electricity generation sources against extreme weather. We
discuss weatherization below. Further details of the Texas blackout, on a finer timeline, can be
reviewed from [1].
Risk and Mitigation; Weatherization
The lack of weatherization was the most significant factor in the 2021 blackouts. It is worth
noting that two different types of weather conditions combined to make the situation worse
than it otherwise might have been. High humidity together with moderately cold temperatures
caused ice formation on wind turbine blades and extreme cold temperatures resulted in reduced
natural gas availability. The Texas Tribune reported that “production of natural gas in the state
has plunged, making it difficult for power plants to get the fuel necessary to run the plants.

Natural gas power plants usually don’t have very much fuel storage on site, experts said.
Instead, the plants rely on the constant flow of natural gas from pipelines that run across the
state.” see [5]. In early February, Texas operators were producing about 24 billion cubic feet
per day, according to an estimate by S&P Global Platts. However, during the extreme weather
event, Texas production plummeted to a fraction of that; operators in the state produced
somewhere between 12 billion and 17 billion cubic feet per day.
A similar though less severe version of the February 2021 events occurred in 2011. A report
published by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation following the February 2011
cold weather event contained several recommendations applicable to ERCOT (see [6]). Over
the past 10 years, ERCOT has made changes that support those recommendations. Significant
modifications include:
• Implemented the Seasonal Assessment of Resource Adequacy report that includes an analysis
for extreme winter weather.
• Began a resource weatherization process that includes an annual workshop, review of
resource weatherization plans and spot checks of facilities.
• Added additional staff (Shift Engineer and Resource Reliability Desk) in the control room.
• Modified the Ancillary Services procurement to allow additional procurement in anticipation
of severe weather.
• Established the Gas Electric Working Group and created a notification procedure for
Qualified Scheduling Entities to notify ERCOT if there are anticipated fuel restrictions.
• Modified the survey sent to natural gas generators. The survey collects information on fuel
switching capability for some resources in preparation for each winter season.
• Changed the rules and processes for withdrawing approval of resource outages in anticipation
of severe weather.
Subsequent to the 2011 blackouts, Texas PUC amended its rules to authorize ERCOT to
conduct generator site visits to review compliance with weatherization plans. Spot checks
include reviewing the weatherization plan, verifying that plant personnel are following the plan
and providing recommendations based on PUC requirements, lessons learned or best practices.
Nevertheless, generation owners and operators are not required to implement any minimum
weatherization standard or perform an exhaustive review of cold weather vulnerability. No
entity, including the PUC or ERCOT, has rules to enforce compliance with weatherization
plans or enforce minimum weatherization standards.
The question then arises on why the generators had not weatherized their fuel supply? To
answer this question, observe that uniform price auctions, such as those operated in the US
markets, and in particular ERCOT, signal scarcity through high prices. Therefore, periods of
supply shortage coincide with (significantly) higher prices. Therefore, a period of shortage
could be quite profitable for some generators which means there is clearly misalignment of
incentives on the generators part. While capacity procurement auctions mitigate this to an
extent, they do not help with procurement of required shorter term storages that can see
generation through an extreme cold spell, lasting hours to days. This problem has been
diagnosed in other markets with a similar “just in time” generation mix such as New England
and some remedies, such as energy options have been suggested [7].
The approach suggested in [7] consists of allowing generators to offer in reserve energy options
that may be called upon in real time (RT). This market is then co-optimized and cleared with
the day ahead (DA) energy market. In a set of previous papers [8] to [11], an enhanced version
of the energy options has been suggested. In particular the authors introduce “pre-dispatch”

products offered by each generator, which would reflect the cost to the seller’s adjustment to
dispatched generation. The adjustment may be upward or downward (i.e. generate more than
indicated in the day ahead, or less), and the cost may be scenario dependent. Such measures
are likely to have a positive effect on voluntary procurement of reserves by generators, but
further research is required to ensure the market mechanisms will result in sufficient supply
side security.
Our discussion above is centered on electricity markets that are fueled by “just in time” fuels
and weatherization readily presents itself as a solution. However there are many other
considerations and methods in the literature when it comes to grid resilience. In [12] for
instance, authors discuss the power system value chain and resilience interdependencies. They
outline broad conclusions on existing approaches to resilience and recommend guiding
principles for improving the resilience of the evolving grid. Other solutions such as utilization
of micro-grids and demand response have also been presented and discussed extensively in the
literature (see e.g. [13]) but are beyond the scope of this brief article.
Winterization of Wind Turbines and Gas Fired Generation
In this section we will describe approaches to weatherization, in particular winterization of
both wind and natural gas fueled generation. We start with wind turbines. Extreme cold weather
can cause ice to form on wind turbine blades. In fact, there are two main types of icing of wind
turbine blades: clear (glaze) ice and rime ice. Glaze ice mostly occurs in freezing rain or other
precipitation, when the blades may be cold (below 32 degrees F) because of previous low
temperatures subsequent to which rain freezes. Rime ice occurs from supercooled water
droplets, such as in fog. The formation of ice interferes with the aerodynamic performance of
the turbine blades and reduces the efficiency of the turbines, sometimes by 20% (see [14, 15]).
Clearly, the solution is to de-ice the blades or to prevent ice formation in the first place. Turbine
blades can be prepared for severe freezing temperatures through systems that proactively heat
the blades. Passive approaches are also options, such as coatings that prevent the ice from
building up. Cold weather packages, used in various jurisdictions such as the Midwest of the
US, Canada and Nordic countries can be implemented to protect a turbine’s gearbox and other
components through heaters in the turbine’s nacelle. These operations can help turbines operate
in temperatures down to -22 degrees Fahrenheit [16]. An important distinction between Texas
and other jurisdictions amenable to accumulation of ice on the turbine blades is the amount of
moisture in the air. Most other such US states have lower humidity levels than Texas. During
the February extreme cold event, the volume of ice on wind turbines reduced power production
from wind to about 50% of what would otherwise be expected.
Siemens was one of the first companies to investigate de-icing techniques and produced the
first de-icing system in 1994. Their electrical method uses built-in carbon heating mats to
remove ice from blades. This system consists of an ice detection sub-system, a heating and a
control sub-system. The price of a wind turbine equipped with gear to handle winter conditions
is estimated to be 5%-10% more than a turbine without winterization. It can cost up to $400,000
more to winterize a 2.5 MW utility scale wind turbine (see [16]).
While loss of power from wind turbines was a significant factor in the February blackout of
Texas, by far the major factor was the decrease in access to gas supplies. King et al. report that
natural gas production in Texas reduced by more than 10 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) in
the extreme cold event of February 2021. This decline of production is due to a phenomenon
called freeze off, whereby water and other liquids present in natural gas gathering lines or

wellheads freeze and obstruct the collection process (see [17]). The same report indicates that
natural gas exports (via pipelines) were reduced to 5% of their normal, steady state operational
levels.
To investigate the cost of winterization for natural gas pipelines, we return to the 2011 report
by FERC and NERC ([6]) that puts the cost of winterization equipment for gas powered plants
anywhere from $50,000 to $500,000, in 2011. In terms of today’s worth accounting for
inflation and assuming cost estimates remain the same, the total cost is estimated to be
equivalent to $95M for winterizing all of the 162 gas-powered plants in Texas (see [18]).
There are different approaches to estimating the cost of the outages in Texas during the
February 2021 storm. The outages lead to property damage (both residential homes and
businesses), contaminated water supplies, loss of economic activity and even loss of life. It is
of course very hard to estimate the monetary value of these damages, although estimates
between $80 billion to $130 billion dollars have been reported (see [18]). In a much more
conservative approach, we can simply estimate a value of lost load (VOLL), which is close to
$6,000/MWh, the spot price reached in ERCOT. Using this price and calculating the power
loss of the February event (namely 70 hours at an average of 14,000 MW), the figure of $4.3
billion dollars is reached.
Conclusion
On balance, with the available cost estimates, and assuming that the extreme weather events
occur with increasing frequency (e.g. one in every ten years or more frequently), it seems that
the winterization expenses are well justified. Nevertheless, the justification of winterization is
based on costs to all of those affected by the extreme weather and not just producers, yet in a
restructured deregulated electricity market, the investment cost must be borne by the producers.
Similar events were encountered in 2011 and left to the wholesale electricity market, however
producers were not enticed to procure storage, weatherize equipment, or find other measures
against energy scarcity encountered due to weather events. Given the nature of scarcity pricing,
there is impending need to structure wholesale electricity markets to ensure that producers are
incentivized to invest in energy security measures. This can be done in conjunction with
regulatory measures for security.
Conflict of interest declaration
This review is funded by the National Science Foundation NSF Research Traineeship (NRT)
program (Award Number 2021693) and Growing Convergence Research (GCR) program
(Award Number 2020888). The authors have no competing interests to declare that are relevant
to the content of this article.
References
[1]
Bill Magness, “Review of February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event – ERCOT
presentation”, Urgent Board of Directors Meeting Feb 2021, available from
http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/key_documents_lists/225373/Urgent_Board_of_Director
s_Meeting_2-24-2021.pdf
[2]
“ERCOT Organization Backgrounder”, available from
http://www.ercot.com/news/mediakit/backgrounder.

[3]
Lloyd Robinson, “Massive Power Failure Could Finally Cause Texas to Connect with
the Nation’s Power Grids”, Scientific American, Feb 2021.
[4]
C. King, Rhodes, J., and Zarnikau, J., “The Timeline and Events of the February 2021
Texas Electric Grid Blackouts”, July 2021. Available from
https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/resources/reports/UTAustin_(2021)_EventsFebruary2021
TexasBlackout_(002)FINAL_07_12_21.pdf.
[5]
“Texas largely relies on natural gas for power. It wasn’t ready for the extreme cold.”,
Erin Douglas, Texas Tribune Feb 16, 2021. Available from
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/16/natural-gas-power-storm/
[6]
“Report on Outages and Curtailments During the Southwest Cold Weather Event of
Feb 1-5, 2011; Causes and Recommendations”, Prepared by the Staffs of FERC and NERC,
August 2011. Available from:
https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/08-16-11-report.pdf
[7]
“Energy Security Improvements: Creating Energy Options for New England”, Matthew
White, ISO New England Report, April 2020. Available from:
https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2020/04/esi-white-paper-final-with-coverpage-04152020.pdf
[8]
G. Zakeri, Pritchard, G., Bjorndal, M., Bjorndal, E., “Pricing Wind: A Revenue
Adequate, Cost Recovering Uniform Price Auction for Electricity Markets with Intermittent
Generation”, INFORMS Journal on Optimization, 2019, Vol 1, No. 1, pp 35-48.
[9]
G. Pritchard, Zakeri, G., Philpott, A., “A single-settlement, energy-only electric power
market for unpredictable and intermittent participants”, Operations research 58 (4-part-2),
1210-1219.
[10] J. Khazaei, Zakeri, G., Oren, S. S., “Single and multi-settlement approaches to market
clearing under demand uncertainty”, Operations Research 65 (5), 1147-1164.
[11] R. Cory-Wright, Zakeri, G., “On stochastic auctions in risk-averse electricity markets
with uncertain supply”, Operations Research Letters 48 (3), 376-384.
[12] M. Dyson, Li, B., “Reimagining grid resilience”, Rocky Mountain Institute, July 2020,
available from https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/reimagining_grid_resilience.pdf.
[13] Y. Wang, Rousis, A. O., Strbac, G., “On microgrids and resilience: A comprehensive
review on modeling and operational strategies”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews
134, 313-320.
[14] H. Hu, “The science behind frozen wind turbines – and how to keep them spinning
through the winter”, The Conversation, March 2021, available from
https://theconversation.com/the-science-behind-frozen-wind-turbines-and-how-to-keep-themspinning-through-the-winter-156520.

[15] A. Lacroix and Manwell, J., F. “Wind Energy Cold Weather Issues”, University of
Massachusetts Amherst, Renewable Energy Research Laboratory, June, 2000, available from
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237706746_Wind_Energy_Cold_Weather_Issues
[16] U. Fellows and Montgomery, B., “The 13,000 Wind Turbines In Texas Can Be
Winterized, But Should They?”, Forbes, March 2021. Available from
https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2021/03/02/when-to-start-planning-for-the-nextdeadly-cold-wave-the-answer-is-now/?sh=a9ed84d23ddc
[17] “February 2021 weather triggers largest monthly decline in U.S. natural gas
production”, Today in Energy - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), May 2021,
available from https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=47896.
[18] G. Golding, Kumar, A., and Martens, K., “Cost of Texas’ 2021 Deep Freeze Justifies
Weatherization”, Available from:
https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2021/0415.aspx.

